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STATE CONTROL OF RADIATION HAZARDS: AN 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS PROBLEMt 
Samuel D. Estep* and Martin Adelman** 
W HENEVER a highly-industrialized complex society assimilates a revolutionary technology, the problems which arise 
invariably are reflected in the legal rules and regulations by 
which a people govern themselves. The advent of atomic energy, 
the most recent technological advance having wide social impact, 
already has presented our legal institutions with a wide range of 
problems, some of which were recognized from the first enactment 
of federal legislation in 1946. Since then, such matters as com-
pulsory patenting, government indemnification of private interests 
against unlimited nuclear tort liability, and compensation for radi-
ation injuries have been widely discussed and analyzed in some 
detail. However, the growing and delicate problem of intergov-
ernmental relations which arises from the convergence of federal, 
state, and local power upon the complex matter of controlling 
radiation hazards has been given relatively little attention. 
The proper allocation of governmental power in a changing 
society wedded to a federal system is a continual problem, and the 
intergovernmental difficulties caused by the assimilation of nuclear 
technology may well have a significant influence on the future 
course of American federalism. For the doctrines that are evolved 
here might be adapted and extended to the problems which will 
arise with the advent of other technologies, if not to problems 
of even wider application. Of more immediate importance, the 
impact of both state and federal power on the nuclear industry 
in the area of radiation hazard control has already caused con-
siderable friction, and it is important that the basic issues be 
resolved without further delay. 
The purpose of this article is to set forth the nature of the 
intergovernmental problem. This involves an analysis of the 
extent and limitations of federal power, a determination of con-
gressional intent on the issue of federal pre-e_!JJ.pti(?n..i and an 
appraisal of the steps now being taken byfthe' Aio:tni~ Energy 
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Commission to turn over part of the radiation safety regulatory 
program to the states. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: AccOMMODATION OF 
FEDERAL AND STATE INTERESTS 
From its inception in 1946 the AEC has exercised almost 
complete control over the regulation of radiation health and 
safety matters. During the early years this control was a natural 
concomitant of the virtual monopoly which the federal govern-
ment had over nuclear reactors and their radioactive by-products. 
The 1954 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, however, per-
mitted private enterprise to participate in the peaceful develop-
ment of nuclear technology, although a concern was expressed at 
that time that federal control would be jeopardized by the dilu-
tion of the government monopoly.1 Such fears proved unjusti-
fied, for although private entrepreneurs have embarked on nu-
clear activities in large numbers, the federal government has 
retained its sweeping control over radiation hazards. It should 
be noted, however, that when Congress enacted the 1957 amend-
ment protecting the infant nuclear industry from unlimited tort 
liability, control over the adjudication of radiation injury claims 
arising from private utilization of radiation sources clearly was 
left primarily to the states.2 
In 1959 Congress modified the act to authorize the AEC to 
enter into agreements with the various states which would permit 
the latter to regulate the health and safety aspects of a consider-
able area of radiation usage.3 The important and difficult prob-
lems in intergovernmental relations presented by these agree-
ments will be discussed in some detail later; but an important 
initial question is the extent to which the states may constitu-
tionally control radiation hazards absent such agreements. 
Authorization to make agreements relinquishing federal con-
trol to the states is based on the assumption that the federal gov-
ernment has the power to pre-empt traditional state power to 
regulate health and safety. Some states, however, have not acqui-
esced in the supremacy of federal power in this area. The health 
1 Reported in Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime 
Private Atomic Energy Activities, 52 MICH. L. REv. 333, 334 n. 6 (1954). 
2 STASON, EsrEP & PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 574 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 
ATOMS AND THE LAw]. Certain exceptions are noted at 575 nn.1276, 1278. 
3 73 Stat. 688 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (Supp. II, 1960). 
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departments of at least two states apparently are taking the posi-
tion that no agreements with the AEC are necessary because the 
federal government constitutionally cannot take away the health 
and safety powers residing in the states as a basic part of their 
police power.4 The same question of conflict between federal and 
state power has also been presented in two litigated cases.5 
A specific example of the emerging conflict of authority illus-
trates the problem. In March 1961, one company asked the AEC 
to clarify its position on whether the AEC or the state of Pennsyl-
vania, in the absence of any agreement, controls the disposal of 
wastes resulting from the processing of certain nuclear materiaV1 
The company asserted that, although it was authorized by the 
AEC to discharge low-level wastes into a river, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health and Safety ordered a fifty percent reduc-
tion in the concentration levels authorized by the AEC. Appar-
ently the company has decided to comply with the state regulation 
rather than contest the validity of the state ruling.7 
Personal conversations with private entrepreneurs in the 
nuclear industry (although not with those in the Pennsylvania 
situation) indicate tl1at in such cases many companies are planning 
to meet the regulations laid down by both the AEC and the states 
-even in areas which the 1959 amendment apparently reserves 
exclusively to the AEC-at least until the state regulations be-
come too onerous to accept. The reason generally given for such 
action is the practical consideration that the companies can ill 
afford to antagonize the state officials who have considerable 
powers over their companies in non-radiation areas, despite the 
fact that the companies probably could win a court fight for 
freedom from such state radiation regulation. 
The prospect of duplicative state and federal regulations not 
only places an unreasonable burden on the operations of the 
nuclear industry, but also raises a serious question as to the nature 
of the basic interests of the federal and state governments which 
need to be safeguarded. It is obvious that both the state and 
federal governments have a strong interest in the health and 
4 Officials of the health departments of Michigan and Massachusetts have taken this 
position publicly. 
ti Harris County v. United States, 292 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961); Boswell v. City of 
Long Beach, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 2481 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960). Litigation of this point was to 
be commenced in Connecticut. ATOMIC IND. REP. 7:119 (April 12, 1961). 
o See ATOMIC IND. REP. 7:110 (April 12, 1961). 
7 This has been reported orally to one of the writers by a government official. 
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safety of their respective populations. Although the state would 
seem to have a more direct and immediate interest, it must be 
kept in mind that radiation respects neither geographical bound-
aries nor man's efforts to neutralize it. Furthermore, the cumu-
lative effect of repeated radiation doses and the genetic impact 
radiation has on reproductive cells adds a time dimension not 
present in traditional health and safety matters. Both these con-
siderations of extended geographic space and genetic time pro-
vide a basis for a strong interest and responsibility on the part 
of the national government. 
On the other hand, the national interest in health and safety 
of the public could hardly be jeopardized by state regulations 
which place stricter limits than the federal regulations impose 
on the permissible amount of radiation exposure. This situation, 
however, brings into play an entirely different federal interest: 
the need to develop a thriving and extensive nuclear industry 
within a relatively short time as industrial growth is measured. 
Over the years the AEC has constantly had to balance the im-
portance of rapid development of the industry against the need 
for adequate protection from radiation hazards. Such judgments 
have often been most difficult because of the incomplete state of 
knowledge about both radiation hazards and nuclear technology. 
If the states can second-guess the AEC on where to strike the 
balance, the national atomic development program might well be 
hampered. 
Nevertheless, these considerations in no way diminish the 
basic state interest in protecting the health and welfare of its 
citizens, and it may be expected that this interest will be vigor-
ously asserted. It is hoped, however, that once the extent of the 
federal interest and power is clearly shown, the states will avoid 
unconstitutional duplicative regulations. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL 
REGULATION 
In considering the extent to which the federal government 
has the power under the Constitution to regulate the health and 
safety aspects of radiation, the interpretations the Supreme Court 
has given to certain provisions of the Constitution which control 
the distribution of power between the federal government and 
the states are central. Particularly relevant are the clauses found 
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in article I, section 8 which enumerate the powers of Congress, 
and in the tenth amendment which states that "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people." 
Although at one time the tenth amendment was given some 
significance by the Court in interpreting the grants of power to 
Congress, for at least the twenty years since United States v. Darby,8 
the Court has considered the amendment as nothing but a truism: 
what has not been delegated to Congress is reserved to the states, 
but the first question asked is not "Is this reserved to the States?" 
but rather, "Is this a power delegated to Congress?" If the answer 
is "Yes," the tenth amendment does not reserve this area to the 
states. 
Equally important is the fact that, although the federal govern-
ment is one of delegated powers only, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the grants of power to Congress very broadly.9 The result 
has been that once some activity is found to have some significant 
relationship, however indirectly, to a power given to Congress, 
there are no significant limitations upon the federal power, aside 
from specific prohibitions such as those found in the first eight 
amendments. The significance of this position for present pur-
poses is made evident by the fact that not once in twenty-five years 
has the Supreme Court invalidated an act of Congress on the 
ground that the activity regulated was not within a power dele-
gated by article I, section 8, and so was reserved to the states, 10 al-
though the sweep of many congressional enactments has been ex-
tremely broad and pervasive in areas traditionally regulated by the 
states.11 
Just before the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was adopted an 
8 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
9 Whether a broad interpretation is called liberal or loose construction depends on 
the commentator's basic philosophy about government control of economic activities. 
10 The last invalidations were United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936) (first Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act) and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous 
Coal Act). 
11 E.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (war-time price control); Yakus 
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (war-time price control); United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (Sherman Act regulation of insurance 
business); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (regulation of wages of 
maintenance workers); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942) (regulation of price of 
wheat produced for home <;.onsumption); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 
U.S. 381 (1940) (coal prices regulation); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 
307 U.S. 533 (1939) (regulation of milk prices). 
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analysis was made of the several powers which Congress might use 
to justify a general regulation of health and safety hazards incident 
to use of all radiation sources, not just those used in federal produc-
tion or research programs.12 The conclusion reached then was that 
probably five different congressional powers could be used to 
justify extremely pervasive federal control: the spending, tax, de-
fense, proprietary and commerce powers. Of these, the first two 
have not been relied upon as yet. A review of the powers actually 
utilized by Congress in enacting the program of federal control, 
and consideration of the admiralty power follows. 
A. Defense Power 
Several findings set forth by Congress in section 2 of the 1954 
act assert the necessity to regulate atomic energy used not only for 
military purposes but also "for all other purposes" in order to 
"provide for the common defense and security." A detailed analysis 
of the possible justification for regulating radiation exposure of 
all persons in the United States is available13 and no subsequent 
case suggests any need to change the conclusion that: "The ques-
tion would seem to be one of whether it is reasonably necessary in 
order to prepare adequately for eventual war that Congress regu-
late the manner in which workers are exposed to radiation as they 
handle radioactive materials in peacetime operation. The atomic 
energy hazards are peculiar enough so that such preparatory 
measures might be upheld by the Court."14 The basic premise of 
the argument, then as now, is that the radiation exposure reserve 
of the whole population, and particularly of radiation workers, is 
a vital factor in our national defense posture in the event of 
nuclear attack upon the United States. 
B. Proprietary Power 
Operation of Federal Facilities. Whether the federal govern-
ment uses federal employees or hires an independent contractor 
to operate federally-owned nuclear facilities, federal power to 
regulate health and safety matters in such operations free of any 
interference by state or local government officials is absolutely 
clear, 15 with the possible exception of use of state-owned facilities 
12 Estep, supra note I, at 333. 
13 Id. at 350-53. 
14 Id. at 353. 
15 Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956) (contractor building Air 
Force base not subject to state license requirements); Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 
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such as sewage disposal facilities and highways, which will be dis-
cussed below. 
Loan or Sale of Federal Material. In addition to its own facili-
ties, the federal government retains ownership of all special nu-
clear material with which reactors are fueled.16 It also produces 
in federally-owned reactors the great bulk of the radioisotopes 
which are used by others throughout the United States. Conse-
quently, the federal government has a considerable health and 
safety regulatory power arising from its power to dispose of such 
government-owned property upon almost any condition it sees 
fit to impose on the user or purchaser of these materials.17 This 
power is the basis for one of the findings made by Congress in 
section 2 of the 1954 act.18 
Until very recently the federal government not only owned 
most of the production facilities for making radioisotopes, but 
also was practically the sole processor of such materials in forms 
useful for industrial, medical and research activities. The few 
radioactive isotopes not available in this manner, such as those 
produced in particle accelerators and a very few naturally-occur-
ring radioactive elements, constitute an insignificant radiation 
hazard and Congress has made no attempt to regulate such sources. 
However, as more private companies operate reactors (which in-
evitably create radioisotopes) and enter the field of processing 
342 U.S. 232 (1952) (state sales and use taxes not applicable to contractor agent of 
AEC); City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945) (federally-owned prop-
erty not subject to state tax); Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 318 
U.S. 285 (1943) (state milk price-fixing statute inapplicable on Army base); Pittman v. 
Home Owners• Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939) (state recording tax not applicable to 
recording for federal agency mortgagee); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) 
(postal official not subject to state driver's licensing requirements); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 
I (1890) (federal marshalls not subject to state criminal prosecution for official acts) ; 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819) (federal bank notes not subject 
to state ta.x) • 
16 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 52, 68 Stat. 929, 42 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958) • For the 
statutory definitions of source, special nuclear material, and by-product material, see 
§§ 11 (x), (y), (e) of the act. 68 Stat. 924 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014 (x), (y), (e) (1958). 
17 United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), discussed 
in Estep, supra note I, at 339. The only subsequent case at all analogous, Alabama v. 
Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954) (per curiam), clearly corroborates the prior conclusion. In 
this case the Supreme Court denied the right of various states to object to the return 
to a few states of mineral rights in off-shore submerged lands because there are no 
limitations on the power of Congress to dispose of federal property. 
18 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 2 (b), 68 Stat. 921, 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1958) : "In per-
mitting the property of the United States to be used by others, such use must be regu-
lated in the national interest and in order to provide for the common defense and 
security and to protect the health and safety of the public." 
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radioisotopes for non-governmental use, the amount of such radio-
active materials not controlled through government ownership 
will become significant. Congressional power to control such pri-
vately-owned material will then become a serious matter. 
Because the use of special nuclear material as yet is absolutely 
necessary for large-scale production of radioisotopes, Congress 
probably can control most radioisotopes by conditioning use of 
special nuclear material in private facilities. Nevertheless, it is 
hoped that before long Congress will see fit to permit private 
ownership of even special nuclear material, and then it will be-
come important to determine whether or not Congress can impose 
health and safety controls on use of such privately-produced and 
owned radioactive materials. Although for most such materials 
the answer seems to be an affirmative one, regulatory supervision 
must be based upon a power other than that which permits Con-
gress to condition the use or disposal of government property. 
C. Admiralty Power 
Controlling the disposal of relatively low-level radioactive 
wastes is becoming increasingly important as the number of users 
of radioisotopes grows rapidly. A considerable proportion of such 
materials is disposed of through discharge directly or ultimately 
into rivers which run through the various states. In sufficiently 
concentrated quantities radioactive wastes so discharged can be-
come a menace to people and property situated downstream. To 
the extent that these are "navigable waters" of the United States, 
Congress may regulate such activity under the grant of admiralty 
jurisdiction to the federal courts. Although this power is in the 
form of a grant of judicial power, 19 it has been interpreted to imply 
a grant of authority to Congress to legislate to control such waters, 
separate from any power Congress may have to regulate many of 
the same activities under the commerce clause of the United States 
Constitution.20 No reason exists for treating congressional power 
any differently when it is used to control radiation sources which 
might endanger normal uses of such navigable waters. Under this 
power Congress undoubtedly can exercise a very extensive health 
19 U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. "The judicial Power shall extend .•• to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction •.•• " 
20 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Comment, From Judicial 
Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. 
L. REv. 1214 (1954) • See also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 
(1940). 
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and safety control over discharge of radioactive materials into 
lakes and rivers and the surrounding oceans. The original judicial 
limitation of navigable waters to tidal waters has long since been 
abandoned and such waters now include all bodies of water within 
the United States and its territories which form part of an un-
brohen water highway system over which foreign and interstate 
commerce might be carried.21 The Court also has defined as 
navigable any body of water in such an unbroken system which is 
capable of being made navigable, and with modem machinery 
this brings within the admiralty power of Congress almost all of 
the lakes and rivers within the various states.22 
In the 1959 amendment, Congress made it clear that the power 
to control such disposal was reserved to the AEC,23 although no 
specific mention was made of the admiralty power. The admiralty 
power, however, does not justify congressional control over most 
uses24 of radioactive materials now being carried out by others 
than the federal government. This will have to be found under 
the power of Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States .... "25 
D. Commerce Power 
As pointed out elsewhere,26 unquestionably Congress has ple-
nary power to control the movement of goods across state lines 
provided the regulations do not infringe constitutionally-protected 
civil liberties. Carriers by rail, highway, air, and water have been 
subjected to such regulation, as well as those who send across state 
lines electrical energy, gas, oil, and wire and radio communica-
tions.27 Likewise, when others than carriers send people or prop-
erty across state lines, even for non-commercial purposes, these 
activities can be regulated or prohibited by Congress.28 The ship-
ment of radioactive materials in interstate or foreign commerce 
obviously is equally subject to congressional power. 
21 Conover, The Abandonment of the "Tidewater" Concept of Admiralty Jurisdiction 
in the United States, 38 ORE. L. REv. 34 (1958). See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 
557 (1871). 
22 See the discussion of Mr. Justice Reed on the issue of navigability in United 
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-10 nn.32-34 (1940). 
23 § 274, 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (c) (3)-(4) (Supp. II, 1960). 
24 As distinguished from disposal after use. 
25 U.S. Cm:ST, art I, § 8. 
26 Estep, supra note l, at 341. 
27 See list of authorities collected in KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151-55 (2d ed. 
1960). 
28 Estep, supra note 1, at 341-42. 
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Far more significant for present purposes is the power of Con-
gress to control those activities which have only a "substantial 
effect" on commerce. Such cases as NLRB v. Jones &- Laughlin 
Steel Corp.,29 United States v. Darby,30 Wickard v. Filburn,31 and 
Consolidated Edison v. NLRB32 make it clear that the indirectness 
of the effect is not a limitation on congressional power to control 
"production" of goods or services for use in interstate or foreign 
commerce, as well as shipments. The extension of such control 
even to radiation health and safety matters would seem no more 
an extension of commerce powers than is found in those cases 
which upheld regulation of wages and hours,33 feather-bedding,34 
exclusive union recognition and compulsory union membership,85 
and strikes in interstate industries.36 The scope of such power to 
regulate those activities which have only an indirect effect on 
interstate movement of goods is indicated by the recent case in 
which the Court held that employees of architectural and consult-
ing engineering firms are engaged in interstate commerce, although 
they only prepared plans and designs for construction and repair 
of interstate instrumentalities or facilities.37 Even professional 
sports spectacles38 and theater attractions39 held within a state are 
subject to the commerce power of Congress because the scope of 
these operations is essentially national in character. 
E. Application of Federal Powers to Radiation Protection 
In the light of the decided cases, the question arises: "Are any 
uses of radiation sources not subject to the power of Congress?" 
As to two sources of radiation this question is not important 
because Congress did not choose to cover them by federal atomic 
energy legislation. The federal definitions of source,4° special nu-
29 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (regulation of labor relations in plant producing for interstate 
market). 
30 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (regulation of working conditions in plant producing for inter-
state market) • 
31 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (regulation of wheat raised for home consumption). 
32 305 U.S. 197 (1938). 
33 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
34 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). 
35 Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
36 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
37 Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959). 
38 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). 
39 United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955). 
40 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 11 (x), 68 Stat. 924, 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (x) (1958) • 
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clear,41 and by-product42 material do not permit the AEC to regu-
late certain radiation machines (particle accelerators and X-ray 
equipment), or naturally-occurring radioisotopes such as radium. 
Particle accelerators and naturally-radioactive materials present 
only limited radiation hazards but the exclusion of X-ray machines 
leaves outside AEC authority a very significant national radiation 
hazard. Because the local interest in protection against such health 
and safety hazards is great, undoubtedly the failure of Congress 
to regulate them means this regulatory power is reserved to the 
states under the Court's doctrines concerning the negative implica-
tions of the commerce clause upon state regulatory power.43 These 
conclusions do not apply, of course, to regulations imposed by 
the Post Office Department and other federal agencies upon inter-
state carriers which handle shipments of dangerous materials. 
These materials are defined broadly enough to include radiation 
sources and states can neither authorize nor prohibit shipments 
once they are in the hands of these carriers. Relatively speaking, 
this is a minor limitation upon state power over this limited 
category of machines and materials. 
Referring, however, only to by-product, source, and special 
nuclear materials which Congress has given the AEC power to 
regulate, how far can the AEC constitutionally go in regulating 
for health and safety reasons? The most difficult constitutional 
questions are presented in connection with by-product materials 
so the analysis will start with them. 
1. By-product Material. To the extent by-product material is 
shipped across state lines, Congress has adequate power to regu-
late-even if solely for health and safety reasons.44 If there is no 
shipment across state lines, Congress probably can continue to 
regulate health and safety aspects under its power to condition the 
use or disposal of government property without limitation at least 
so long as the federal government retains its present policy of 
ownership of all special nuclear materials. Congress, however, also 
purported to control all by-product material, whether or not 
shipped in or produced for interstate commerce.45 The available 
41 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 11 (y), 68 Stat. 924, 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (y) (1958). 
42 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 11 (e), 68 Stat. 923, 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (e) (1958). 
43 See ATOMS AND THE LAw 1054. 
44 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. 
45 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 81, 68 Stat. 935, 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (1958), provides, 
"No person may transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, trans-
fer, acquire, own, possess, import, or export any by-product material, except to the 
extent authorized by this section or by section 2112 of this title." 
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authorities support the conclusion that to the extent that such 
material is sold commercially, although solely within the state of 
production, it is subject to the commerce power of Congress. By 
combining the ideas upheld in the Darby and Filburn cases with 
those propounded in the intrastate railroad rate cases,46 it is rea-
sonable to predict that the Court will permit congressional control 
of these intrastate activities which compete with and have some 
economic effect on the interstate market for by-product material. 
Under the doctrine of Filburn, even production of by-product 
material for self-consumption might be federally controlled under 
the commerce power. But if the Court is unwilling to extend the 
Filburn doctrine, the amount of material produced for self-con-
sumption will be insignificant and the resultant health hazard 
relatively unimportant.47 
One other minor category remains to be considered. A few 
radioisotopes are produced largely, if not solely, for research pur-
poses and are not available commercially for a variety of reasons. 
Producers of these, therefore, are not in competition with com-
mercial suppliers for the interstate market in by-product material. 
These materials produced by universities, or even private com-
panies, for their own research because they are not feasibly avail-
able elsewhere would seem to be outside the commerce power of 
the federal government, although possibly within the war power 
in its broadest sense, or within the power to condition use of 
government-owned special nuclear material (which is needed to 
produce the by-product material). Likewise, the shipment of such 
materials in interstate commerce or on navigable streams, or the 
disposal of them into navigable waters forming part of an un-
broken water highway, will be subject to federal control as in-
dicated before. Consequently, only the use and storage or burial 
within one state of such self-produced material is outside the 
federal commerce and admiralty powers. These admittedly very 
small amounts of radioactive materials do not constitute much 
46 Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. &: Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922). 
47 Under the reasoning of the Filburn case (which permitted federal regulation of 
wheat raised by a farmer on his own land to feed his own livestock) , even production of 
by-product material for self-consumption may be federally controlled under the com-
merce power. Admittedly, the controls in the Filburn case were more clearly economic 
regulation than are radiation hazard regulations, but if the private producer can short-
cut on his hazard precautions he places himself at a competitive advantage if he sells 
to others. He is probably even taking himself out of the interstate market in the Filburn 
sense because, if he had to follow regulations which commercial producers are required 
to meet, he probably would have bought in the market instead. 
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of a hazard in the over-all picture and this limitation on federal 
power is insignificant. 
2. Source Material. A distinction must be drawn between 
mining such material and transferring it after removal from its 
place of deposit in nature. Although serious radiation hazards 
are present in mining operations and the AEC is concerned about 
them, Congress apparently meant to leave this to the states and 
the AEC does not attempt to regulate such activities.48 Any transfer 
of mined source-material, however, is subject to AEC health and 
safety regulations, as well as federal allocation of materials poli-
cies.-i0 Until such transfer, however, the states now have exclusive 
power to regulate mining operations, although Congress probably 
could extend its power to this sphere if it cares to do so in the 
future upon the basis of the same authorities discussed in connec-
tion with by-product materials. Likewise, with very minor excep-
tions, federal regulation of all transfers of source material, even 
when done solely within the confines of one state, probably is con-
stitutional under the commerce and admiralty power case au-
thority suggested in the analysis of the power to regulate by-
product materials. 
3. Special Nuclear Material. The most important concern of 
the federal government here is with allocation of the supply, not 
the radiation health hazards of the material itself. No question can 
be raised about the power of the federal government to provide 
for the "common defense and security" by assuring an adequate 
supply for military purposes and by preventing the diversion of 
such material to those whose possession of it would constitute 
a threat to our national security. An adequate supply for national 
purposes, however, apparently is no longer a problem for either 
source or special nuclear material. Likewise, distribution to most 
domestic users will present no threat of diversion to unauthorized 
military uses. 
Assuming neither of these concerns is involved, may Congress 
nevertheless regulate all such material for health and safety pur-
poses? Under the authorities cited above with respect to any kind 
of material sold by the government, or shipped across state lines, 
48 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 61, 68 Stat. 932, 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (1958), provides for 
control of "any source material after removal from its place of deposit in nature." The 
AEC has made no attempt to regulate mining activities. 
49 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 62, 68 Stat. 932, 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (1958); AEC Reg. 
Part 40, IO C.F.R. § 40 (1959). 
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or produced for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce, Con-
gress clearly also has the power to control special nuclear material, 
and has exercised it. But if the policy of government ownership 
of special nuclear material is changed to permit private owner-
ship, the commerce, and possibly the admiralty and war powers, 
will probably justify health and safety control over special nuclear 
material which is not directly involved in interstate commercial 
transfers, on the same basis as control over by-product material. 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL POWER 
To CoNTROL STATE-OWNED FACILITIES 
Of considerable importance is the possible limitation upon 
federal power to regulate radioactive material when state-
owned facilities such as city sewage systems, state highways and 
city streets, and state or city research and medical treatment facili-
ties are involved. Congress clearly may protect workers and the 
general public against what the federal authorities feel are unac-
ceptable radiation hazards under the property disposal, admiralty, 
commerce, and war powers, as suggested earlier-even though 
only state-owned facilities are used by state employees or the 
general public. When the federal government has an important 
interest in such matters its interest is paramount under the su-
premacy clause of the Constitution. The state, therefore, cannot 
allow higher exposures and immunize such persons from regula-
tions established by federal authority. 
1 The federal supremacy argument, however, cannot be used to 
justify denial to the states of the power to establish lower exposure 
limits in the interest of health and safety if only state-owned facili-
ties not competing in interstate business are involved. If a state 
wants to deny access to its toll roads and superhighways, or impose 
more stringent regulations than those established by federal regu-
lations for carriage of radioactive materials upon state roads, or 
for discharge of such wastes into city sewage systems, or for use of 
these materials in state teaching, research or medical treatment 
institutions, surely the theory of a federal system indicates that 
the state may do so. Federal supersedure of such state radiation 
level limitations would in effect amount to taking state property 
L without compensation to promote a federally-desired use. 
This conclusion does not apply to attempts of cities to zone 
specifically against radiation operations on land within the city 
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limits. State zoning power probably is pre-empted by the federal 
legislation50 because the property being controlled typically is 
privately-owned land, and in a conflict between state and federal 
regulation the latter controls under the supremacy clause. Nor 
is this situation analogous to the state-owned railroad which is 
subject to federal safety regulations because it is operating in 
interstate commerce.51 The state-owned facilities under considera-
tion are not operated as a state-owned interstate commercial ac-
tivity. Neither is this situation similar to cases involving the power 
of the federal government to tax proprietary functions being car-
ried out by the state,52 because no significant diminution of federal 
sources of revenue would result from more stringent state control 
of safety in use of radiation on state-owned property, even assum-
ing that the use is a proprietary function. 
Authority upon this conflict-of-power question is almost non-
existent. Certainly if the federal government took the position 
that a property owner who leases his building to a user of radi-
ation sources cannot impose radiation regulations more stringent 
than those established by the federal government, the answer 
would be that the government must condemn the property and pay 
just compensation.53 Although the government has a legitimate in-
terest, the possible effect on development of the nuclear field would 
not seem to outweigh the right of the property owner to impose 
his own conditions which involve less danger to health and safety. 
Even if the owner of a private building could be so regulated, the 
additional factor of state sovereignty surely leads to the conclusion 
that Congress could not go so far when state property which 1s 
being used for traditional governmental purposes is involved. 
li0 The basis for this conclusion is set out in ATOMS AND THE LAW, 1047-48, 1065. City 
of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958), may imply approval of such 
supersedure, although it actually turned on a res judicata point. See text accompanying 
note 58 infra. 
51 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). See also California v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944), in which state-owned wharves were subjected to federal 
regulations on free wharfage time and minimum prices; and California v. Taylor, 353 
U.S. 553 (1957), in which a state-owned railroad serving interstate commerce was sub-
jected to federal labor regulation. 
li2 Wilmette Park District v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949) ; New York v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) . 
53 The zoning ordinance cases permitting certain non-compensable limitations on 
use of private property are not controlling. In each case the government was limiting 
normal uses to which the owner could otherwise put his property. In the present situa-
tion federal supersedure of state limitations on the use of state property would amount 
to an order forbidding the owner to restrict certain uses of his property. 
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In two cases involving state regulation of weight and width 
of motor vehicles using state highways, the Supreme Court avoided 
the conflict of federal and state power question by finding that 
Congress, when it gave general regulatory power to the ICC, did 
not mean to preclude state regulations aimed at physically pre-
serving the highways.54 Nevertheless, particularly in the second 
case, the Court suggested that state ownership raised a serious ques-
tion concerning the federal power to regulate. 55 In a more recent 
case involving use of highways in violation of weight limitations,M 
the Court said that the state might not suspend an interstate car-
rier's right to use the highways for a specified time as punishment 
for violating the load limits because there was no showing that 
this drastic measure was necessary since it could enforce its weight 
regulations adequately with conventional forms of punishment. 
There was no suggestion that the state regulations themselves 
were superseded. 
Johnson v. Maryland/'1 decided in 1920, suggests some limita-
tion upon the right of the state to control use of state highways. 
In holding that the state could not insist that federal postal em-
ployees have a state driver's license before using state roads, the 
Court held that the state could not so directly interfere with 
federal employees carrying out federal functions. For several rea-
sons, the Johnson case is not controlling in the radiation case here 
suggested. First, at most it applied only to federal employees regu-
lated by the state, not to workers in private industry. Second, it 
suggests only that the state could not establish the qualifications 
of government employees who operate the vehicles or facilities 
discharging radioactive wastes into sewage systems. There is no 
suggestion that the state could not enforce its traffic laws aimed 
at safety, such as driving on the right-hand side of the road or 
stopping at red lights. In the radiation situation, surely the state 
could regulate more stringently, or probably even prohibit, use 
of the state facilities to private persons and even federal authori-
ties-so long as it did not try to dictate qualifications of federal 
54 Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) ; South Carolina State Highway Dep't 
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
55 Maurer v. Hamilton, supra note 54, at 609 n. 8 (Mr. Justice Stone quoting a con• 
gressional witness's report) • 
56 Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954). See also Bibb v. Navajo 
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), holding invalid an Illinois regulation requiring 
certain mudguards on trucks because they were not shown to be any safer than the 
conventional type. 
57 254 U.S. 51 (1920). 
1961] STATE CONTROL OF RADIATION 57 
employees using such materials. The same would be true for city 
sewage systems and other state facilities of the kind suggested here. 
The possible implications of a recent case, City of Tacoma v. 
Taxpayers of Tacoma,58 should not be overlooked. Here, under 
a federal statute a city was authorized to build a dam which would 
result in the flooding of a state-owned fish hatchery, and the state 
opposed the city's use of power under the federal statute. An argu-
ment could be made that this case permitted the federal govern-
ment to dictate a use of state property contrary to that wished by 
the state. The case, however, does not support the application of 
this idea to the situation where the state imposes lower radiation 
exposure standards on use of its property. In the first place, the 
Supreme Court decided it on a procedural point involving res 
judicata principles, rather than on the merits of whether or not 
Congress could supersede state control over its own political sub-
divisions and property. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that 
this taking would be without compensation. 
If this analysis is correct, a rather serious limitation on federal 
power exists. Transportation of radioactive material over state 
highways, and discharge of fairly large quantities of low-level 
wastes into sewage systems, are important factors in the develop-
ment of the nuclear industry and of expanded use of radioiso-
topes. If the states enforce regulations incompatible with federal 
standards, as some have done already,59 the federal government will 
need to resort to its condemnation power which would be pro-
hibitively expensive, or find substitutes for these state-owned 
facilities. In the future, financial aid for federal highway construc-
tion might be conditioned upon acceptance of federal participa-
tion in health and safety regulations, but this will not suffice for 
highways already built without such conditions. Substitutes can 
be found, of course, but in many cases, such as air, water, or rail 
transportation, or collection and burial of low-level wastes, the 
expense will be considerably greater and actually burdensome. 
This fact, however, does not justify breaking down our federal 
system by ignoring the rights of the states and their legitimate pro-
prietary interests in their own facilities. The best solution un-
doubtedly is mutual trust and cooperation. Nevertheless, the prob-
lem is not simply hypothetical; such state power is being asserted. 
58 City of Tacoma v. Ta.xpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958) . 
59 Massachusetts has banned shipment on its toll roads, ATOMIC IND. REP. 7:66 
(March 1, 1961), and AEC officials have warned of the limiting effects, ATOMIC IND. REP. 
7:282 (Sept. 6, 1961). 
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT To PRE-EMPT STATE PowER 
In spite of these limitations upon federal power, for most pur-
poses Congress has ample authority to authorize comprehensive 
regulation of almost all health and safety hazards arising from 
source, special nuclear and by-product material. In most situations 
the only question that remains is one of congressional intent: "Did 
Congress intend to pre-empt all regulatory control constitutionally 
within its power or, if not, what has been left for the states?" This 
depends upon the interpretations to be given to the 1954 act00 and 
the 1959 amendment. 61 
A very detailed analysis was made of the federal pre-emption 
question as applied to atomic energy matters prior to the 1959 
amendment. 62 Although the 1954 act and its legislative history 
contained practically no reference to the pre-emption question, 
an analysis of the regulatory powers established in the act and the 
most nearly analogous pre-emption cases arising under other fed-
eral statutes clearly supported the conclusion that as a general 
proposition the AEC health and safety power in most cases pre-
empted the field for the federal agency. Exceptions were found,63 
but the conclusion was reached that the general intent was to pre-
empt the field for the federal government. 
To the extent that the provisions of the 1954 act left uncer-
tainties about Congress' intent to give the AEC exclusive jurisdic-
tion in general, these were resolved by the 1959 amendment. 
Although the amendment does not expressly pre-empt the field 
for the federal agency, the clear implications of its provisions and 
the legislative history of the enactment indicate that the general 
theme was to preclude most state power as to radiation hazards, 
except to the extent that an agreement is made by the AEC to 
permit the state to assume some of the regulatory power previously 
lodged in the AEC. 
One of the stated purposes of the amendment is "to clarify the 
respective responsibilities . . . of the States and the Commis-
sion .... " 64 This suggests that Congress meant to define the re-
spective powers of the states and the AEC, and to provide that 
each has only such powers as are defined in the federal legisla-
60 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1958). 
61 73 Stat. 688 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (Supp. II, 1960). 
62 ATOMS AND THE LAW 1008-74. 
63 Id. at 1065-67 and 1072-74. 
64 73 Stat. 688 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (a) (1) (Supp. II, 1960). 
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tion. This conclusion is corroborated by part of section 274 (b) 
which provides that the states have authority to regulate radiation 
hazards "during the duration"65 of an agreement with the AEC. 
The implication "and not otherwise" is obvious. Again, subsec-
tion (c) provides that as to certain radiation activities "the Com-
mission shall retain authority,"66 and the character of these opera-
tions indicates rather clearly that Congress feels that only the AEC 
is qualified to regulate them. This implies that the AEC continues 
its exclusive powers over these few activities. The conclusion that 
could then be drawn is that state power arises only upon execution 
of an agreement. 
Additional evidence is found in subsection ( d) which instructs 
the AEC to make an agreement for state control only if it finds \ 
the state program is "adequate" and "compatible."67 If the states 
already had concurrent jurisdiction there would be no need 
for an agreement scheme and certainly no reason to insist upon a 
finding of adequacy and compatibility. The amendment also has 
a provision for termination or suspension of an agreement with 
reassertion of federal authority,68 as well as one to the effect that 
nothing in section 27 4 affects the rights of the states to regulate for 
purposes "other than protection against radiation hazards."69 
Neither would be necessary unless the federal act was meant to 
supersede state power over radiation hazards. 
The interpretations here suggested certainly are what the 
drafters of the amendment had in mind. In several places, the 
committee report ·accompanying the bill shows that "it is not in-
tended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent 
jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulating 
by-product, source, or special nuclear materials. The intent is to 
have the material regulated and licensed either by the Commis-
sion, or by the State and local governments, but not by both."70 
In the light of this evidence, therefore, a general intent to pre-
empt, except when an agreement is made under the 1959 amend-
ment, is the only reasonable conclusion. 
Unfortunately, this disarmingly clear expression of general 
65 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (b) (Supp. II, 1960). 
oo 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (c) (Supp. II, 1960) • 
67 73 Stat. 689 (1959) , 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (d) (Supp. II, 1960). 
os 73 Stat. 690 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 G) (Supp. II, 1960). 
60 73 Stat. 691 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (k) (Supp. II, 1960). 
70 Comments by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1959), 1959 U.S. CODE CoNG. & .AD. NEWS 2879. 
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intent does not solve the hard questions which arise when con-
sideration is given to particular aspects of state action which have 
some impact on uses of radiation sources. Consequently, other 
than indicating that any doubts should be resolved in favor of 
federal pre-emption, the 1959 amendment adds nothing to the 
reasoning suggested before in analyzing the pre-emption effect of 
the 1954 act: "In reality there is not one pre-emption question but 
many-as many as there are types of state health and safety actions 
affecting federally regulated atomic energy activities. Each of these 
questions can only be answered by considering the particular state 
action in relation to the system of federal law and administrative 
action as well as the nature of the matter regulated."71 
Therefore, in order to bring into focus the extent to which the 
state can continue to regulate nuclear activity absent an agree-
ment with the AEC and consistent with constitutional doctrine 
and congressional intent, the following conclusions about specific 
state regulatory action are suggested. 
I. Radiation sources, other than by-product, source and special 
nuclear material as defined in the federal statute, can be regulated, 
regardless of whether or not they move in interstate commerce, 
provided, of course, that the regulation does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce72 and does not conflict with applicable 
regulations concerning interstate transportation established by 
federal agencies.73 These sources include X-ray and fluoroscopic 
devices used in medicine and science, as well as in commerce and 
industry, atomic particle accelerators, naturally occurring radio-
isotopes (other than source material), and isotopes made radio-
active by processes other than exposure to radiation in reactors. 
2. Non-radiation hazards in construction and operation, even 
of federally-licensed activities such as reactors, can be regulated. 
These hazards could be subjected to state and local rules dealing 
with electrical wiring, plumbing and sanitation, structural design 
and materials, fire prevention and equipment, elevator design and 
safety features, ventilation (to the extent that radioactive material 
is not involved), safety features on non-radiation machinery and 
equipment, and other matters not directly related to radiation 
safety.74 To the extent, however, that any of these regulations con-
n ATOMS AND THE LAW 1054. 
72 Dean Mille Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), and cases cited therein. 
73 Such as those general regulations issued for rail, air, and water carriers by federal 
agencies. 
74 ATOMS AND THE LAW 1055-58. 
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stitute an obstacle to compliance with a federal regulation, al-
though the purpose of the state industrial safety requirement is 
different from that of the AEC's regulation, there would be pre-
emption.75 If this analysis is correct, state and local governments 
may require submission of installation plans and specifications to 
appropriate officials. From this analysis it also follows that a doctor 
licensed by the AEC must nevertheless have a state license to prac-
tice medicine. 
3. Zoning of nuclear installations again falls partly within and 
partly without the category of powers the states or local govern-
mental units can continue to exercise. The only health and safety 
determination made by the Commission is that a particular pro-
duction or utilization facility is radiologically safe for a proposed 
site. The Supreme Court, therefore, would not deny to the states 
or local governments the power to exclude the facility from a 
particular location altogether, if the reason for doing so is not 
related to radiation health and safety and the facility is not owned 
by the federal government. The holder of a facility construction 
permit from the Commission could be prohibited by a state from 
building in an area zoned against commercial and industrial es-
tablishments.76 The issuance of a construction permit indicates 
no more than the fact, as determined by the Commission, that 
there is reasonable assurance of radiation safety. The issuance does 
not suggest that the Commission has determined that operation 
of the facility in the particular location will not affect the health 
and safety of the public in some other objectionable manner, such 
as by substantially increasing truck traffic on residential streets. 
Such facilities which are owned by and operated for the federal 
government for its own purposes, however, are not subject to 
local zoning laws. 77 Likewise, if the zoning ordinance discrimi-
nates against radiation facilities it falls within the scope of the 
federal health and safety program and pre-emption principles 
apply. The federal legislation also does preclude the state from 
75 Id. at 1056. 
76 Id. at 1065. 
77 No Supreme Court cases directly on point were found, but the federal government 
so assumes in purchasing property such as for military bases. The conclusion follows 
logically from the basic attitude expressed by the Court in such cases as TVA v. ·welch, 
327 U.S. 546 (1946) and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), although overriding of 
state zoning laws was not included in either case. "Once the object is within the au-
thority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is 
clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end." Berman v. 
Parker, supra at 33. 
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allowing a damage action to private persons for what might be 
called psychological nuisance created by the loss in property values . 
which might arise solely from fear of the mere existence of a 
reactor or reprocessing plant.78 The same reasoning controlling 
applicability of zoning regulations supports this conclusion. 
4. Registration with state and local authorities can be re-
quired of federal licensees of radiation sources because this con-
stitutes no serious interference or substantial burden upon the 
AEC program and is very necessary if local authorities are to 
carry out such functions as fire and police protection with a min-
imum of risk. 
5. Violation of federal regulations probably can be controlled 
by state injunctive or criminal sanctions imposed on those oper-
ating within the state even if no agreement has been made with 
the AEC permitting the state to assume regulation of radiation 
hazards.79 
6. State-owned facilities such as highways and sewage systems 
can be regulated under stricter standards than those imposed un-
der any federal license for reasons pointed out before.80 More 
liberal state regulations, however, would not immunize the licen-
see from federal authority. 
7. State-licensing of operations regulated under the federal 
program almost surely is precluded-unless the state executes 
a section 27 4 agreement. This conclusion applies even to those 
activities exempted by the AEC from its licensing regulations, or 
covered by a general license, because in these cases the AEC has 
determined that these matters do not need to be stringently con-
trolled. 81 Several characteristics of the federal licensing scheme 
justify this conclusion. The scheme established by Congress and 
implemented by the AEC is extraordinarily pervasive. In addi-
tion, the AEC is directed-not merely permitted-to establish a 
licensing program. It seems clear from all the evidence that Con-
gress did not intend that the states could second-guess the AEC's 
judgment on where to strike the balance between rapid develop-
ment of this vital industry and adequate radiation safeguards. 
Of course, the state can ask the AEC to consider its interests in 
78 ATOMS AND THE LAW 350-54. 
79 Id. at 1072-74. 
80 Text following note 58 supra. 
81 ATOMS AND THE LAW 1063-67. 
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deciding whether or not to grant a license.82 And once a license 
is granted, the state can enter into a limited agreement with the 
AEC which would permit state inspection of federally-licensed 
activities in cooperation with federal authorities.83 This agree-
ment might be adopted in situations in which the AEC (or the 
state) does not care to make an agreement for the latter to assume 
full regulatory power. 
But aside from these rather narrow ranges of state power, the 
generally pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation leads to only 
one conclusion: unless a state executes an agreement with the 
AEC, the state is constitutionally precluded from imposing gen-
eral health and safety regulations upon users of source, special 
nuclear and by-product materials. Therefore, if the states want 
to resume their traditional role in protecting public health and 
safety, they must meet the criteria established by the AEC for 
executing such agreements. 
V. THE FEDERAL "TURN-OVER" PLAN 
The plan adopted by Congress in 1959,84 and implemented by 
the promulgation of criteria in 1961 by the AEC,85 provides for 
a partial and conditional turn-over of regulatory power after a 
state has entered into an agreement with the AEC. In addition, 
the right to rescind the grant of power is reserved under certain 
conditions.811 This method of distributing governmental power, 
by which the states are required to satisfy detailed conditions be-
fore the AEC will relinquish its regulatory control, has yet to be 
tried in the United States on any significant scale,87 and should 
be scrutinized most carefully because the way in which the prob-
lem of federal relinquishment is handled here is likely to have 
an effect on our federal system that transcends this particular 
technology. 
Heretofore, Congress has adopted many different methods of 
ad justing power between the federal government and the states 
82 78 Stat, 691 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (l) (Supp. II, 1960). 
83 73 Stat, 690 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (i) (Supp. II, 1960). 
84 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 688 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 
(Supp. II, 1960) • 
SIS 26 Fed. Reg. 2536 (1961). . 
811 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 690 (1959) , 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (j) 
(Supp. II, 1960), 
87 But cf. National Labor Relations Act § 10 (a), added by 61 Stat, 146 (1947), 29 
U.S.C. § 160 (1958), under which the NLRB is authorized to cede, by agreement, juris-
diction in certain cases to a state, 
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in dealing with such matters as liquor control,88 highways,89 public 
health,90 social security,°1 river pollution,92 and employer liabil-
ity.93 Traditionally, however, once the federal government has 
returned regulatory power to the states, Congress has given the 
states discretion to decide whether or not regulation is necessary 
and, if so, to determine what regulations to impose. But with 
nuclear energy Congress has developed a method of turning over 
regulatory control to the states which protects essential federal 
interests by requiring the AEC to develop and apply conditions 
precedent to the transfer of power. In the past, Congress usually 
has obtained state adoption of a federally-desired program by buy-
ing it through financial inducements. This has taken the form 
of tax rebates (e.g., estate tax94 and unemployment compensa-
tion95), or federal grants-in-aid conditioned on meeting specific 
prerequisites (e.g., highway building programs06). In none of 
these cases did the federal government give the states power when 
uniformity of regulation was considered essential, or investigate 
the qualifications of state personnel, or keep regulatory power if 
the states did not assume responsibility. 
This new plan for controlling radiation hazards can be de-
scribed as a federally-imposed regulatory scheme which is admin-
istered by the states which develop the details that are not specified 
in the federal criteria. This federal-state relationship retains the 
advantages of local administration and law-making while protect-
88 After a long and turbulent history of state and federal liquor control in the United 
States, the twenty-first amendment was ratified. This amendment has been held to give 
the states unrestricted power to legislate on liquor control. Finch Co. v. McKittrick, 305 
U.S. 395 (1939). 
80 Highway construction has called forth extensive grants-in-aid programs. See, e.g., 
72 Stat. 885, 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). 
90 In the public health field the federal government provides advice and assistance 
to the states in addition to financial assistance to many state health programs. See Public 
Health Service Act, 58 Stat. 682 (1944), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-292 (1958). 
91 Grants-in-aid programs are used extensively by the federal government for social 
welfare purposes. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301-71 (1958). 
92 The Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466 
(1958) authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to seek a federal in-
junction to abate water pollution which endangers the health and welfare of persons in 
a state other than that in which the discharge originates. 
93 Congress has given state courts concurrent jurisdiction in the enforcement of rights 
under FELA, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958). 
94 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2011. 
95 Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, 626 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 501 
(1958). 
96 72 Stat. 885, 887 (1958), 23 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1958). 
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ing federal policy through the use of federally-developed con-
ditions for turn-over of control to the states. 
In analyzing the plan adopted, consideration will be given, 
first, to the statutory provisions for relinquishment; second, to 
the provision for recovery of federal control; third, to the area of 
delegation proscribed by the amendment; fourth, to the specific 
criteria promulgated by the AEC, and then to judicial review 
of AEC determinations. The adequacy of the total scheme as a 
method of resolving the federal-state control question will then 
be evaluated. 
A. Statutory Requirements for Relinquishment to the States 
After the governor of a state certifies that his state is ready to 
take over control,97 the Commission must find that the state pro-
gram is (1) "compatible"98 with the AEC's program, and (2) 
that the state program is "adequate to protect the public health 
and safety .... "99 These requirements present questions of fact 
for the Commission's determination and therefore give consider-
able discretion to the Commission. Nevertheless, there are some 
guides in the legislative history which limit this discretion. There 
are a few minor additional prerequisites to turn-over,100 but ad-
equacy and compatibility are the basic ones, and of these two, 
compatibility presents the more sensitive issues. 
In explaining the meaning of the compatibility requirement, 
the committee report makes it clear that this means "iden-
tical,''101 except for minor variations such as terminology or 
periods for measuring maximum permissible exposures. The 
committee report states that the language "to the extent feasible," 
was removed from the proposed bill so that there would be no 
danger of "conflicting, overlapping, and inconsistent standards 
in different jurisdictions, to the hindrance of industry and jeop-
ardy of public safety."102 
As to the "adequate state program" requirement, Congress 
seems to be concerned only that the AEC find that there is a 
97 § 274, 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (d) (I) (Supp. II, 1960). 
os Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021 (d) (2) (Supp. II, 1960). 
oo Ibid. 
100 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021 (e) (Supp. II, 1960) • 
101 s. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1959) • 
102 Id. at 9. 
66 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
large enough staff of well-qualified state personnel to assure pro-
tection against health hazards.103 
B. Recovery of Federal Control: Termination or Suspension 
of the Agreement 
Although Congress has made clear its desire to achieve a non-
duplicative and uniform regulatory program, the provision for 
termination or suspension of a section 27 4 agreement creates a 
serious interpretation problem which may be indicative of an 
unresolved congressional ambivalence when the amendment was 
adopted in 1959. The agreement with a state can be abrogated "if 
the Commission finds that such termination or suspension is re-
quired to protect the public health and safety."104 Once the 
, AEC has found that a state's program is adequate and compatible, 
it would be reluctant to find that the once-adequate program is 
now insufficient, but it has the express power to do so. On the 
other hand, no express statutory language gives the AEC the 
power to rescind the agreement if the state subsequently estab-
lishes a program which is no longer compatible with the federal 
criteria, assuming the public health and safety are not endangered. 
This would be true if the state imposed more stringent standards. 
However, an interpretation of the statute which would restrict 
the power of a state to deviate from the criteria is possible. This 
view is that the specific provision for termination or suspension 
implies only that the AEC must always reserve the power to re-
scind for health reasons, but does not preclude the AEC from 
placing in the tum-over agreement a reservation of additional 
grounds for rescission. This interpretation is somewhat strained, 
however, because the expressio unius canon of construction would 
indicate a contrary conclusion and, in addition, the committee 
report makes it clear that the rescission power is ','to be exercised 
only under extraordinary circumstances."105 
Apparently Congress never quite made up its mind whether 
it wanted unfettered state control so long as a state continued to 
have adequate facilities for protecting the public health and safety, 
or whether it envisioned an active partnership between the federal 
government and the states with the federal interest protected by 
103 Id. at 8. 
104 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 690 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 {j) 
(Supp. II, 1960) • 
105 S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959) • 
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continuation of the initial criteria of compatibility. The better 
approach would be to have general standards established by the 
AEC, allowing the states considerable discretion as to the methods 
of implementation and enforcement within their boundaries, but 
not permitting state deviation from federal standards which would 
interfere with national policy. This result can best be brought 
about by a congressional amendment giving the AEC authority to 
revoke or suspend state authority if a state deviates substantially 
from the standards laid down in the criteria or deviates from rea-
sonable future changes in AEC regulations. Lacking such an 
amendment, the AEC should exact a promise from the states that 
they will not deviate substantially from the criteria, on penalty of 
termination or suspension. Even if such a promise would have 
no legal force, its moral force would probably be sufficient to re-
strain a state from departing from the federal standards. 
C. Statutory Limitations on Agency Delegation 
Certain restrictions are imposed upon the AEC by the 1959 
amendment that severely limit the extent to which the AEC may 
permit the states to regulate radiation hazards. Thus, the AEC 
cannot agree to allow a state to regulate production or utilization 
facilities; 106 the export or import of by-product, source or special 
nuclear material;107 any special nuclear material in quantities suf-
ficient to form a critical mass;108 or disposal of wastes into oceans or 
seas.109 An appraisal of the more important of these restrictions 
will show that many of them are not necessary for the protection 
of federal interests, but could be handled by the agreement-mak-
ing process. 
I. Production and Utilization Facilities. The AEC is not 
permitted to return to the states power to control the production 
of special nuclear material or the utilization of it in reactors. 
Typically these installations are the largest and most complex of 
our nuclear facilities and present the greatest dangers to the pub-
1011 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021 (c) (1) (Supp. II, 1960) • 
107 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021 (c) (2) (Supp. II, 1960) • 
108 This prohibition is not explicitly stated in § 274. However, it may be implied 
from § 274 (b) (3) which authorizes states by agreement to regulate "special nuclear ma-
terials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass.'' 73 Stat. 689 (1959) , 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021 (c) (3) (Supp. II, 1960). 
100 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 689 (1959) , 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021 (c) (3) (Supp. II, 1960). 
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lie health and safety. Retention of federal control to protect the 
national security is necessary, but national security is not, by itself, 
a sufficient reason for refusing to permit state regulation of the 
safety features of production and utilization facilities. The pri-
mary justification for the exclusion of the states in this area seems 
to be that analysis of the very complex technical data needed 
to assure safety is beyond the capabilities of existing state per-
sonnel. 110 A second reason may be the feeling that the develop-
ment of this technology is so important, both for the national 
economy and for our international relations, that the delicate 
balance between rapid development and protection of public 
health and safety should be the responsibility of the federal gov-
ernment. However, these objectives could be met by the use of 
federally-imposed criteria in the same way as they will be applied 
to by-product, source, and special nuclear materials of less than a 
critical mass. In this area, Congress should amend section 274 to 
give the AEC authority to turn over control to the states, but also 
to refuse to transfer regulatory power to the states if the Commis-
sion determines that the hazards or potential hazards are such 
that regulation should continue with the AEC.111 The AEC 
probably has such discretion through its determination of "ad-
equacy." Nevertheless, because of the great risks involved in this 
area, the authority to refuse transfer of control should be unam-
biguously stated. 
2. Export or Import of By-product, Source., or Special Nuclear 
Material. The states are precluded from the regulation of the 
export and import of the three categories of materials which they 
can regulate. The states have never been permitted to control 
exports and imports112 and no reason exists for permitting them 
to do so with respect to radiation sources any more than with other 
dangerous materials. 
3. Waste Disposal into the Oceans. The precise reason for 
precluding the states from regulating disposal of waste materials 
into oceans and seas is difficult to ascertain, although there can 
be little dispute over the extent of federal power in this area.113 
110 S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959) • 
111 The Committee Report recognizes that§ 274 is interim legislation. Id. at 9. 
112 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § IO. 
113 See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950) , which sustained federal owner-
ship of mineral deposits underlying the coastal waters on the theory that the federal 
government had sovereign control and dominion over the marginal seas. See also United 
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
1961] STATE CONTROL OF RADIATION 69 
Three possibilities suggest themselves. Congress may have rea-
soned that exclusive federal control must be retained because 
such disposal has obvious international consequences. However, 
the danger of intermeddling state regulation would be eliminated 
by the establishment of federally-imposed maximum permissible 
concentrations and the barring of disposal in places where, in the 
opinion of the federal government, it could create international 
repercussions. 
Another possible reason is that preparations for such wast<! 
disposal are so technical that state personnel are not qualified to 
handle the determinations necessary to control such activities. 
The operational problems are not nearly as complex as those in-
volved in the evaluation of reactors, however, and would seem to 
be well within the competence of some state agencies. Further-
more, the AEC has discretionary power to refuse to transfer con-
trol of certain waste disposal operations114 and this power is 
ample to handle the situation where the hazards are too great for 
state control. 
In any event, a third reason does justify exclusive federal con-
trol. Except for mineral rights held by certain states, the sub-
merged land under our coastal waters is legally owned by the 
federal government. Therefore, it would seem that control of 
such areas should be in the federal government, if Congress 
thought it wise to assert control based on ownership. Under the 
last of the three possible justifications, exclusive federal control 
should not apply to inland waters which flow directly into the 
oceans whereas the first two possible reasons raise questions about 
the control of disposal in streams emptying into coastal waters:115 
4. Transfer of Nuclear Material. In addition to the proscribed 1 
areas of delegation, the AEC is authorized, although not directed, / 
to license all transfers of possession or control of any product con- 1 
taining any by-product, source or special nuclear material which 1 
the states may control after an agreement is made pursuant to 
the amendment. As explained by the committee report, the 
AEC requested this provision.116 The Commission did not pro-
114 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274, added by 73 Stat. 689 (1959), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021 (c) (4) (Supp. II, 1960). 
115 Apparently, the AEC is not planning to assert exclusive control of streams or 
rivers emptying into coastal waters. See 26 Fed. Reg. 7884 (1961) in which the AEC 
defines ocean or sea to mean "any part of the territorial waters of the United States 
and any international waters." See S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10·11 (1959). 
116 S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1959). 
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pose to attempt to regulate "manufacture, transportation, or use" 
of such products but felt that when they are sold in interstate and 
foreign commerce it is important that uniform rules be applied.117 
Furthermore, the AEC explained that if the expected rapid growth 
in use of such materials in interstate products does occur, the 
extent of such distribution in the country as a whole becomes 
important and transcends state lines.U8 Nevertheless, it would 
seem that like most other federal objectives these can be met 
through the use of federal-state agreements. 
D. Atomic Energy Commission Criteria 
Although no formal agreements are effective as yet, 119 the 
broad outlines of what these agreements will contain can be de-
termined fr<;>m a detailed analysis of the AEC's criteria which are 
now in final form. To a large extent the criteria represent the 
judgment of the AEC on the proper allocation of regulatory 
power. This judgment, however, had to be exercised within the 
scope of the "adequacy" and "compatibility" requirements spec-
ified by Congress. In analyzing the criteria, several standards are 
used by the authors as a guide in determining whether the AEC 
should impose these limitations upon the states in order to pro-
tect the federal interests implicit in the compatibility and ad-
equacy requirements. They are (1) the need for a national 
uniform requirement, (2) the value of experimentation by the 
states, (3) the national implications of the health and safety 
dangers involved, and (4) the promotion of the development of 
the nuclear industry. 
The criteria are divided into eight sections. The first states 
the dual objectives of any regulation program, "to protect the 
health and safety of the people" and to encourage "the construc-
tive uses of radiation."120 
1. Establishing Standards. Potentially there are two types of 
regulations in this area. One involves the setting of basic standards. 
The other is the detailing of the means for meeting these stand-
ards. Except in a few isolated instances, 121 the criteria in this 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 The AEC has recently announced a proposed agreement with Kentucky, 26 Fed. 
Reg. 7889 (1961). However, the agreement is phrased in general terms and does not 
change the following analysis. 
120 Criterion 1, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961) • 
121 E.g., AEC regulations concerning disposal by burial in soil. 10 C.F.R. 20.!04 (1959) • 
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section set the standards and leave to the states considerable free-
dom to experiment with various methods of achieving compliance 
with these standards. The criteria require that state maximum per-
missible exposure levels for workers and the public must conform122 
with AEC standards. The standards for waste disposal also are re-
quired to be consistent with the AEC regulations.123 Therefore, the 
states are not permitted to legislate on these important matters af-
fecting the health and safety of their citizens. Nevertheless, Con-
gress and the AEC have made the proper decision. The present low 
levels at which the standards are pegged are a response to fears of 
genetic injuries, although there is also some concern with the vari-
ous forms of somatic radiation injuries. Genetic injuries are of na-
tional as well as local concern, particularly in a mobile society, 
because their effects are expressed in many generations. Further-
more, the total exposure from civilian uses of radiation sources 
of our population may have some bearing on our ability to with-
stand a nuclear attack. In addition, imposition of standards lower 
than the AEC's would prove costly to the industry and might 
seriously impede the national policy of promoting atomic devel-
opment. All these federal interests should be and are protected 
by the criteria. 
The AEC, on the other hand, is permitting the states consider-
able discretion in the implementation of these standards.124 In 
addition to providing a suitable climate for the development of 
new and improved methods of implementing present standards, 
the plan should promote an increased state feeling of responsibil-
ity for, and participation in, the country's atomic energy program. 
In the area of technical definitions and terminology, the AEC 
is requiring only that the states strive for uniformity.126 Here 
the AEC should have required uniformity. Little can be hoped 
for by state experimentation, and a uniform terminology would 
facilitate communication throughout the country. The only 
justification for failing to require uniformity is that some states 
in their previous regulation of X-rays may have developed their 
own terminologies, making it difficult to change suddenly to 
uniform terminology and technical definitions. When writing 
agreements under the existing statute, the AEC should permit 
122 Criterion 3, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961) • 
123 Criterion 9, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). 
124 Criteria 3 and 9, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961) • 
125 Criterion 3, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). 
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deviation in terminology and technical definitions only when the 
imposition of uniform national terminology would present a se-
rious hardship to the state. 
Similarly, the AEC specifies that it is desirable to achieve uni-
formity in labels, signs and symbols, and the posting thereof.126 
Here also, uniformity would be very desirable, but the effects are 
localized and not too important. The AEC is requiring uniformity 
in labels, signs, and symbols affixed to radioactive products which 
are transferred from "person to person"127 and this will probably 
control the most significant cases. However, the criteria do not 
define "person to person." It is possible to interpret this literally 
so that uniformity would be required every time a person handed 
radioactive material to another person. On the other hand, it 
may refer only to the situation where a transfer of legal control 
is made, such as when one corporation sells the product to another. 
The difference in these two interpretations is significant in con-
sidering the practical effect of the uniformity requirement. 
The AEC is requiring that the regulations applicable to the 
shipment of radioactive materials be compatible with those estab-
lished by the various authorities of the federal government.128 
Here regulations different from those of the federal agencies 
would make life difficult for a user carrying on both intrastate 
and interstate business and this commercial interest justifies the 
requirement of compatibility. 
Through this whole important section there is no direct at-
tempt by the AEC to influence the regulation of radiation sources 
which have always been under state control, such as X-rays. If 
the amendment had authorized the AEC to set standards for the 
use of X-rays, the same reasons for compulsory standards as sug-
gested previously would apply because radiation from an X-ray 
machine has the same effect as the gamma radiation of radioactive 
isotopes. The criteria require, however, that the states must 
consider the total occupational radiation exposure of individuals, 
including that from sources which are now regulated by the 
state.129 This requirement, when coupled with the further re-
quirement that the states must insist on the keeping of employee 
exposure records,130 implies that the states must regulate X-rays 
126 Criterion 6, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961) . 
121 Ibid. 
12s Criterion 10, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). 
129 Criterion 4, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). 
130 Criterion 11, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). 
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at least to the extent necessary to determine the amount of occu-
pational exposure to X-rays. This is a sensible provision, since 
the employee's body needs protection against all sources of radi-
ation and any satisfactory control system must take into account 
all sources. The national interest in knowledge of all occupa-
tional exposure to radiation is protected by the keeping of records 
that are available to the federal government. 
The AEC, however, has imposed additional record require-
ments. The state must require employers to make available to 
former employees a report of any radiation exposure.131 Further, 
at the request of an employee, the employer must inform an em-
ployee in writing when he has radiation exposure in excess of 
the prescribed limits and, if requested, must inform an employee 
of his annual radiation exposure.132 While keeping of records that 
would be available to the national government is of national 
interest, the availability of these records to employees is not. The 
primary interstate interest is the need for uniformity and accuracy 
of records when an employee works in different states. This 
could be satisfied without requiring reporting to workers. An 
argument could be made that forcing revelation of exposure levels 
to employees will act as an automatic safety-standard enforcement 
technique because workers and their unions will point out danger-
ous trends in particular situations. Nevertheless, it is not hard 
to guess that this requirement is motivated primarily by a desire 
of unions to facilitate the prosecution of workmen's compensation 
claims. There would seem to be no more reason for federal in-
trusion into the administration of state workmen's compensation 
laws for radiation injuries than for many other occupational haz-
ards. Such federal intrusion generally may or may not be wise, but 
there is little justification for singling out radiation exposure cases 
for special treatment. 
2. Prior Evaluation of Uses of Radioactive Materials. The 
criteria require that there be prior evaluation of radiation uses.133 
Although the term "prior evaluation" is used, it nonetheless is a 
licensing scheme.184 The AEC has decided that the technology 
is not sufficiently standardized for regulations alone to provide 
complete health and safety protection and has determined that 
131 Criterion 11 (d) , 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961) • 
132 Criteria 11 (d) and 11 (e) , 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961) • 
133 Criterion 13, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961) • 
lM Ibid. 
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a licensing scheme is necessary at this time. Furthermore, the 
AEC has set down standards for the states to use in the licensing 
process: the adequacy of the applicant's facilities and safety equip-
ment,135 his training and experience in the use of the materials 
for the purpose requested,136 and his proposed administrative 
controls.137 
Whether or not licensing is necessary to secure compliance 
is basically a decision on what is the most feasible type of admin-
istration. The type of administration necessary to secure compli-
ance is primarily of local concern, and the AEC, by not permitting 
the states to experiment with other methods of controlling radi-
ation hazards, may well be preventing the development of more 
effective control mechanisms. However, the criteria recognize 
that as more is learned about the technology, licensing in many 
cases may not be necessary and the states are given the power to 
decide when this will be true.138 This freedom to abandon licens-
ing in some areas and substitute other regulatory mechanisms 
makes the requirement of licensing in the criteria more justifiable 
since the AEC is making only an initial determination. 
The criteria also require that, for use of radiation on humans, 
the state license only those individuals who have some training in 
such uses of radioactive materials.139 This provision will embroil 
the states in the controversy within the medical profession as to 
which medical groups should be permitted to use certain special-
ized tools. At the present time a state license to practice medicine 
legally permits the licensed physician to engage in all forms of 
medical practice. The profession is given the responsibility of 
setting up and enforcing by group pressure the selection of cer-
tain medical groups that may use various highly specialized 
techniques such as brain surgery, use of X-ray machines, etc. Al-
though medical exposure has some national implications, on bal-
ance it would be sensible for the AEC not to force the states to 
interfere with the workings of their medical control system. Some 
such interference would be very helpful because many unquali-
fied persons now use radiation as well as other specialized tech-
niques in medicine, but this broad problem should be left for the 
135 Criterion 14, 26 Fed. Reg. 2538 (1961) • 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Criterion 13, 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). 
139 Criterion 15, 26 Fed. Reg. 2538 (1961) • 
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individual state to handle, unless the federal government wants 
to impose this type of regulation upon the medical profession 
generally. 
3. Administration. This section140 presents another serious 
inroad into matters which are essentially local. The state must 
give assurances to the AEC that there will be a fair and impartial 
administration of regulation. These include a provision for pub-
lic participation, where appropriate, in such procedures as form-
ulating rules of general applicability, approving applications for 
licenses or authorizations to possess and use radioactive materials, 
and taking disciplinary actions against licensees. Fair procedure 
is a local matter of intense concern to the parties affected but of 
little importance to national interests except as good state govern-
ment is good for the national welfare. Due process should be 
the limiting federal control. 
The problems inherent in the overlapping jurisdiction of 
state agencies are recognized in the criteria141 but no particular 
solution is specified. The AEC does want assurances against du-
plicate regulation and licensing by state and local authorities and 
indicates that it may be desirable that there be a single or central 
regulatory authority. Under existing state administrative regula-
tory organization, control of atomic energy might be shared by 
several agencies such as the health department, labor or indus-
trial department, highway or police commission, utility commis-
sion, water pollution commission, fish and game commission, etc.142 
Because of the loss of power that these agencies would suffer if a 
single regulatory agency to handle radiation regulation were 
created, these agencies tend to oppose the establishment of a single 
regulatory agency. The AEC sensibly has not required the states to 
provide a centralized agency. There is a good basis, however, for its 
statement that this form of administration is desirable. The special-
ized training required to handle and evaluate radiation problems, 
coupled with the scarcity of people trained in atomic energy, argues 
strongly for a centralized agency. However, political considerations 
involved in interagency power struggles are a bar to this solution 
in many states. 
The AEC along with the Council of State Governments has 
published a recommended statute which provides for three forms 
140 Criterion 23, 26 Fed. Reg. 2538 (1961). 
141 Criterion 24, 26 Fed. Reg. 2538 (1961). 
142 ATOMS AND TiiE LAW 880-951. 
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of administration.143 One of the alternatives is the centralized 
agency scheme.144 Another sets up the office of coordinator whose 
job is to coordinate the regulations of the various state agencies 
that would have regulatory power under existing state adminis-
trative organization.145 Under this plan, the governor is empow-
ered to veto any regulations that are incompatible with those of 
the other regulating agencies. This form of regulatory coordina-
tion provides an adequate method for the elimination of overlap-
ping regulations promulgated by various state agencies. The pre-
vention of overlapping regulations, which would present a sub-
stantial hindrance to the users of radioactivity, is the only national 
interest which the AEC would protect by dictating the form of 
state administration, and therefore, any administrative scheme that 
provides a method for handling jurisdictional conflicts should be 
-satisfactory to the AEC. The inclusion of the coordinator plan in 
the AEC's suggested state legislation indicates that the AEC has 
_-correctly decided to insist only on the prevention of overlapping 
regulations. The last alternative, 146 and next to the separate agency 
the most desirable, involves placing the rule-making authority in a 
board within the public health service, a department whose existing 
functions are closest to those required for proper radiation pro-
tection. The actual enforcement, however, would be carried out 
by the existing state agencies. From a political standpoint this 
alternative is feasible because of the strong political position 
within state governments of many departments of health. 
4. Coverage, Amendment, Reciprocity. This section speci-
fies that control of any one of the three categories of materials 
(source, special nuclear, by-product) may be turned over to the 
states, but the state must assume control of all of a category or 
categories.147 This is an unsound provision. A situation could 
arise where the AEC would decide that a state was not fully qual-
ified to regulate all uses or material of a particular category, but 
that easier and less dangerous materials or uses were within a 
state's capacity. In this situation, if a state is making an earnest 
143 Council of State Governments, Comm. of State Officials on Suggested State Legis-
lation, Development and Regulation of Sources of Ionizing Radiation, State Radiation 
Control Act 20 (1961). See also suggested model state statute in ATOMS AND TIIE LAW 
1089-1110. 
144 Id. at 24-25. 
145 Id. at 22-24. 
146 Id. at 25-26. 
147 Criterion 27, 26 Fed. Reg. 2539 (1961). 
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effort to prepare itself for regulatory responsibilities, but is not 
able to take over full control, the state should be permitted to 
control as much of the category as it is able to handle. The AEC's 
requirement is probably a response to the fear that a state will 
desire to regulate only the more glamorous materials and leave 
to the AEC the more pedestrian tasks. If this is the source of the 
provision, the problem could be handled more directly by re-
quiring a showing of good faith on the part of a state which 
desires to regulate only a portion of a category. A good faith re-
quirement would free the AEC to turn over control of a portion 
of a category where legitimate reasons exist for the state's inability 
or reluctance to regulate the whole area. 
This section also suggests that arrangements for reciprocal 
recognition of state and federal licenses should be made.148 This 
provision should have been mandatory. There is substantial com-
mercial convenience in having licenses which are granted in one 
state recognized as valid in other states. Since the AEC has set 
the standards of both the regulatory and licensing programs of 
the states, a state cannot realistically complain that if it is forced to 
recognize automatically an out-of-state license it may be permit-
ting the out-of-state licensee to engage in activities which would 
be forbidden to its own citizens. Therefore, since there would 
be a considerable lessening of commercial inconvenience through 
the use of reciprocal recognition of licenses, without at the same 
time interfering with the internal policies of the states, the AEC 
should have required reciprocity and should not sign agreements 
unless some reciprocity provision is included. This may upset 
the practice in some cases of using safety-justified licensing as a 
hidden economic discrimination against out-of-state interests. 
E. Judicial Review of AEC Decision Adverse to State 
If a state government feels aggrieved by the refusal of the AEC 
to find that the state radiation regulatory program justifies a 
"turn-over" agreement, may the state appeal to the courts for an 
order directing the AEC to execute one? 
Although, in general, administrative action or inaction is re-
viewable when Congress is silent about appeal to the judiciary, 149 
some question exists about the appropriateness of such review in 
us Ibid. 
HO 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 28.05 (1958). 
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the AEC-state agreement situation. The amendment of 1959 
makes no mention of judicial review and certainly the agreement-
making process was not considered by Congress when enacting the 
general review provisions of the 1954 act. These review pro-
visions are directed primarily to the licensing of users of radiation 
sources, and owners and operators of certain nuclear facilities.150 
In addition, it can be argued that because these agreements are 
the result of negotiations between two sovereigns, political accom-
modation rather than judicial review is the appropriate remedy. 
On the other hand, because the federal government has pre-
empted the regulatory power, the negotiations are not between 
two sovereign equals. When a state approaches the AEC for a 
return of regulatory power it is more like an individual asking 
the federal agency for the grant of a license or privilege. Undoubt-
edly, federal officials could be arbitrary, or possibly even act 
without statutory justification, in refusing to make an agreement 
with the requesting state-just as when a private petitioner requests 
some federal license. Although such clearly arbitrary action is 
unlikely, without a judicial remedy an individual state would be 
almost helpless. The Supreme Court might decide, therefore, 
that Congress did not intend to put the states in such a plight, but 
rather intended the agreement process to be appealable and in-
cluded no such provision in the 1959 amendment only because it 
assumed the general review provisions would govern. In any 
event, judicial review should be provided for the unlikely case, 
and Congress should make this clear by a specific amendment. 
Assuming judicial review to be available without amendment, 
only the traditional judicial remedies would be applicable. Typ-
ically, mandamus is used when a government official refuses to 
take proper action, but this remedy has some historical distinc-
tions which limit its applicability even though the right to judicial 
action otherwise would exist.151 Here again Congress should make 
specific provision for an appropriate review remedy. 
Even if judicial review is possible, the courts would be very 
unlikely to reverse an AEC determination adverse to a state. The 
determination of whether or not the state has a satisfactory pro-
gram is a matter of judgment based on an evaluation of each re-
quest and the courts undoubtedly will be very reluctant to second-
guess the AEC unless the agency makes a series of decisions which 
150 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 189, 68 Stat. 955, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1958) • 
151 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 149, §§ 23.09-23.13. 
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make the courts lose confidence in its expertise and fairness. When 
a state is the requesting party this reluctance may be even greater 
than normal. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that Congress has the constitutional 
power (with limited exceptions) to pre-empt state regulation of 
the health and safety aspects of nuclear materials; and Congress 
has clearly expressed its intent to do so as to most of the field. 
Therefore, if the states want to exercise lawful control over these 
matters, they must execute turn-over agreements with the AEC. 
The federal-state relinquishment technique, based on local 
administration of national standards, has two principal advan-
tages. First, it assures that the establishment of general radiation 
protection standards will be made at a level where highly techni-
cal and sometimes competing factors of national interest can best 
be balanced. Second, leaving enforcement to the states allows 
each state to adapt regulatory control to local conditions, with 
the added opportunity for experimentation in the most effective 
regulatory methods. 
An analysis of the federal plan to turn over certain regulatory 
functions to the state governments indicates that, while funda-
mentally sound, some key problems remain unresolved and that 
certain provisions are of questionable merit. The authors have 
attempted to make constructive suggestions to remedy some of 
these difficulties. For Congress the major suggestions are that 
it (a) clarify certain statutory ambiguities concerning supersedure 
of state power; (b) condition federal grants-in-aid for construction 
of state facilities on the acceptance of federal radiation standards; 
and (c) grant express authority to the AEC to rescind a state's 
authority to regulate when the state's radiation standards are no 
longer compatible with those of the AEC. 
The AEC is urged to (a) relax the rules that require a state 
to establish a licensing system, and that make a state take control 
of all-or-none of a category of nuclear material; (b) refrain from 
interfering in such internal state matters as employer-employee 
relations in workmen's compensation matters, the type of state 
administrative procedure which will insure a fair hearing, and 
the licensing of medical personnel to use certain radiation mate-
rials; and (c) make mandatory its provisions concerning reciprocal 
recognition of state licenses by other states, and for uniformity of 
symbols, terminology and definitions. 
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Nevertheless, these proposed changes, although important, do 
not detract from the general excellence of the turn-over plan. 
Overall, it is an imaginative and useful way of accommodating the 
interests of the state and federal governments, the nuclear indus-
try, and the general public. As similar problems of federal-state 
relations arise in connection with· other technological develop-
ments, the basic approach which has been worked out for regulat-
ing radiation hazards should be of general applicability. Such 
problems as water pollution, air contamination, and the alloca-
tion and use of natural resources are becoming increasingly im-
portant to the whole nation and their control might well be 
worked out along the lines used for atomic energy. Indeed, if the 
AEC-state agreement plan succeeds in providing an adequate 
adjustment of basic inter-governmental conflicts, it will point the 
way for a significant advance in pragmatic American federalism. 
